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Abstract
Samuelson (1947) stated that a regular equilibrium exhibits the transfer paradox if and only if it is
unstable. Gale (1974) and many in the early 1980’s debunked this equivalence by adding extra countries,
reaching an anti consensus.
We reinterpret Samuelson’s result as identifying the threshold, i.e. the minimum level of trade beyond
which the transfer paradox appears.
This reinterpretation generalizes fully to ﬁnitely many countries and commodities, and reaﬃrms the
anti consensus quantitatively.
A by-product is an explicit general example of Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994), that whatever
the equilibrium prices and incomes, the welfare impact of a transfer is made arbitrary by some compatible
economy.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Germany’s reparations after World War I provoked a controversy about terms of trade. Did the reparations
improve or worsen her terms of trade? Did the new terms of trade exacerbate or mitigate her income loss
due to reparations? Leontief (1937) showed by example that a donation could so change terms of trade as
to erase the income loss and beneﬁt donor—the transfer paradox.
Samuelson (1947) noted the regular equilibria exhibiting the transfer paradox were those unstable with
respect to tatonnement. Others conﬁrmed this beautiful characterization of the transfer paradox, at least
with two countries and two commodities; Mundell (1968), Balasko (1978).
Theorem 1 (Samuelson 1947) With two countries and two goods, suppose a regular equilibrium. Then
the local transfer paradox is present if and only if it is unstable.
Most deemed instability a theoretical curiosity, the situation where demand increases with prices. By
Samuelson’s equivalence, the transfer paradox too became a theoretical curiosity, and interest in it waned.
Accordingly, Samuelson’s equivalence remained the big result on the transfer paradox, and became the
wisdom on the topic, seemingly even after Scarf’s (1960) examples of instability.
Almost thirty years later, Gale (1974) showed by example that Samuelson’s equivalence broke down with
a third country.
T h e o r e m2( G a l e1 9 7 4 )With three Leontief countries and two goods, there is an example of a stable
equilibrium exhibiting the local transfer paradox.
Yet the example failed to shatter the received wisdom, perhaps because Gale never pointed out its
stability, never wrote ”transfer paradox.”
Chichilnisky (1980) discovered the stability of Gale’s example, and further showed its dependence on the
preferences of the countries. That it took so long to detect stability evidenced how ingrained Samuelson’s
wisdom had been—why check, if it must be unstable? Once advertised, this set oﬀ a stampede of research in
the early eighties, excited by the surprising news, by the renewed plausibility of the transfer paradox, and
by the chance to charge at current wisdom.
1The stampede mostly split between extending Gale’s counterexample and Chichilnisky’s analysis, always
with two goods. New examples appeared in Polemarchakis (1983), and in Leonard and Manning (1983)
with non-Leontief utilities (two Cobb-Douglas, one quasilinear).1 The analyses (a) relaxed utilities from
being Leontief, (b) clariﬁed the role of excess demands, marginal propensities to consume, and elasticities
of excess demand, (c) derived formulas for the welfare impact of small donations in terms of these notions.
Yano (1983), Ravallion (1983), Bhagwati et al. (1983), Dixit (1983) singly managed all these extensions.
Retaining Leontief utilities, Geanakoplos and Heal (1983), Polemarchakis (1983), and Chichilnisky (1983)
gave a priori, equilibrium-independent bounds on endowments and utilities guaranteeing the equilibrium to
be unique, globally stable, and consistent with the transfer paradox. Consensus settled on
• the donor’s trade level being required large enough,
and on this requisite level being increasing in
• 1) the proximity between the donor’s and the recipient’s marginal propensities to consume
• 2) the substitution eﬀect, explaining the preponderance of Leontief utilities in examples
In particular, emphasis turned toward the notions in (b) and away from stability.
The remainder focused on the existence question. From Dixit’s (1983) formula Safra (1984) obtained
Theorem 3 (Safra 1984) With more than two countries and with two goods, suppose an unstable equilib-
rium where some trading country’s marginal propensity to consume is neither largest nor lowest. Then there
is a stable equilibrium exhibiting the transfer paradox, with the same equilibrium prices and incomes but less
trade.
This was another charge, generalizing Gale’s example to smooth preferences and multiple countries—
curiously, instability did cameo. Earlier, Safra (1983) had argued nonconstructively that for almost any
equilibrium prices and incomes, there was a compatible economy exhibiting the transfer paradox. Given
any small desired welfare impact and endowment reallocation, Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) showed
1Aumann and Peleg (1974) discarded endowments, instead of reallocating them.
2more constructively that for almost any equilibrium prices and incomes, there was a compatible economy
exhibiting the given welfare impact as the de facto welfare impact of the given reallocation.
Altogether, the stampede set oﬀ by Gale and Chichilnisky sidelined Samuelson’s equivalence as dramat-
ically as it itself had sidelined the transfer paradox. If not all targeted what was wrong with Samuelson’s
equivalence, none looked for what was right with it.
We propose a point of view that rescues Samuelson’s equivalence and reaﬃrms the anti consensus, even
though the latter arose out of attacks on the former. The key idea is that whether an equilibrium is unstable
or stable is a precise answer to whether the trade level is or is not large enough relative to
• 1) the proxinity between the donor’s and the recipient’s marginal propensities to consume
• 2) the substitution eﬀect
To see it, we revisit the classical decomposition of the Jacobian J of aggregate demand
J = S − Σmizi0
where S is the sum of the countries’ substitution eﬀects, mi is country i0s marginal propensity to
consume, and zi its excess demand for the nonnumeraire commodities. With two countries, it reads
J = S −∇ z10
where ∇ = m1 − m2 is the diﬀerence between their marginal propensities to consume, thanks to market
clearing z1 +z2 =0 . With two goods, an equilibrium is unstable, by deﬁnition, if J>0. Thus Samuelson’s
equivalence is that the transfer paradox is present or absent according as J>0 or J<0. The threshold





Indeed, this reaﬃrms the anti consensus, in that the threshold trade level S
∇ is increasing in the proximity
1
∇ between marginal propensities to consume, and in the substitution eﬀect S. Samuelson’s equivalence,
once reinterpreted, ironically encapsulates and quantiﬁes the anti consensus.
3We show that the threshold reinterpretation generalizes fully to a ﬁnite number of countries and com-
modities. This requires making sense of the ratio S
∇ with multiple commodities, when ∇ is no longer a
scalar. It requires makings e n s eo ft h et r a d el e v e l |z| with multiple countries, when the equality
¯ ¯z1¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯z2¯ ¯
as an unambiguous norm is unavailable.
Fixing the price of C commodities and incomes of H countries, implies the aggregate substitution eﬀect
S = ΣSi and the marginal propensities to consume (mi). Discarding the numeraire, S is negative deﬁnite
and symmetric, hence deﬁnes an inner product on net trades n ∈ RC−1 of nonnumeraire commodities,
(n,n)=n0(−S−1)n, and a norm, knk =
p
(n,n). If z =( zh) are the equilibrium net trades at the













° °z1° ° =
1
k∇k
Thanks to market clearing,







Theorem 4 (Samuelson reinterpreted) With two countries and two goods, the threshold for the transfer
paradox at regular equilibria is 1
k∇k.
One generalization is to multiple goods C ≥ 2.
Theorem 5 (Threshold with multiple goods) With two countries, the threshold for the transfer para-
dox at regular equilibria is still 1
k∇k.
With multiple countries, the donor can play the welfare of one recipient against another’s, unboundedly.
With just two countries, this is impossible because there is a sole recipient. For this reason the threshold is
no greater than the above. Speciﬁcally, for each country let
∇




With H =2 clearly ∇
1 = ∇. Then
4Theorem 6 (Threshold bounded above) With H,C ≥ 2 countries and goods, the threshold for h to
be a protagonist in the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is at most 1 √
H−1k∇hk. So the threshold for the
transfer paradox at regular equilibria is at most minh
1 √
H−1k∇hk.
We now report the threshold for h to be a protagonist.
Deﬁnition 1 Fix ˙ v ∈ RH with ˙ vh =1 ,10˙ v =0 , to be interpreted as the welfare impact of an inﬁnitesimal
donation. Then deﬁne the numerator
n(˙ v)=
s
(ΣS ˙ vi +1 )
2
|S| +1
+ Σ\S ˙ vi2 (1)
where S ⊂ {1,...,H}\{h} is as follows. Ordering ˙ v−h : ˙ vi1 ≥ ... ≥ ˙ viH−1,S= {i1,...,in} for the largest n
such that
if i ∈ S ˙ vi >
ΣS ˙ vi +1
|S| +1
That is, S ⊂ H − h consists of the best oﬀ: those better oﬀ than the average of the group consisting of the
even better oﬀ and of h. Now deﬁne
∇
h(˙ v)=mh + Σi6=hmi˙ vi
Finally, deﬁne2
Th =i n f
n(˙ v) √
Hk∇h(˙ v)k subject to ˙ vh =1 ,10˙ v =0
Theorem 7 (Threshold computed) With H,C ≥ 2 countries and goods, the threshold for h to be a
protagonist in the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is T h. So the threshold for the transfer paradox at
regular equilibria is minh Th.
It seems impossible to compute Th in general; after all, the program is the ratio of two convex functions
over a noncompact domain. Of course, given particular equilibrium prices and incomes, a computer would.
2This exists by completeness of the reals, because the objective is bounded below by zero.
5On the other hand, the upper bound is easily seen to come from ˙ v−h = − 1
H−1. For the numerator, note
S = {1,...,H}\{h} and n(˙ v)= H



















This gives theorem 6. Further, when H =2 the constraint set ˙ vh =1 ,10˙ v =0 is a singleton, the above
˙ v−h = − 1
H−1, and this upper bound is the inf . This gives theorem 5.
Our notion of threshold with multiple commodities is Samuelson’s if H =2 , but weaker if H>2. It
is equal in that no equilibria are paradoxical with trade levels below the threshold. It is diﬀerent in that
not all equilibria with trade levels beyond the threshold need be paradoxical, but there exists a sequence of
paradoxical equilibria with trade levels converging from above to the threshold.
Curiously, the deﬁnition of this threshold that rescues Samuelson’s equivalence hinges on Samuelson’s very
consumer theory: the substitution eﬀect is symmetric and negative semideﬁnite. Even more, Samuelson’s
equivalence ﬁrst appears in the same place as his consumer theory, a footnote in Samuelson (1947).
2M o d e l
Countries h =1 ,...,H consume commodities c =1 ,...,C, C being the unit of account, in terms of which
all value is quoted. Markets assign prices p ∈ P ≡ R
(C−1)
++ to commodities c<C ,and incomes w ∈ RH
++
to all countries.4 The set of budget variables is
b ≡ (p,w) ∈ B ≡ P × RH
++
and commodity demands xh : B → RC
++ depend on own income only, xh(p,w)=xh(p,w0) if wh = w0h.
















=1+( H − 1) 1
(H−1)2 = H
H−1
4Unity is the price of C,w h i c h P omits. The addition to p of the C coordinate with value unity is denoted p.





++ | Σeh = r
ª
The equilibria are
E(r)={(p,e) ∈ P × Ω(r) | (p,e0p) ∈ B(r)}
There is a natural projection π : E(r) → B(r),π(p,e)=( p,e0p) and a b−equilibrium is one in π−1(b).
Demand is neoclassical if there is a utility uh : RC
+ → R solving uh(x(b)) = maxβh(b) u throughout




+ | p0x = whª
. In this case welfare is v(b)=( vh(b)) = (uh(xh(b))). The
point of separating budget variables from the economy is that welfare is determined by the budget variables,
and in turn these are determined by the economy in equilibrium. We assume Debreu’s smooth preferences.
3 Welfare impact of reallocation
We think of a smooth path e(ξ) t h r o u g hag i v e ne c o n o m y e = e(0), and of an inﬁnitesimal reallocation
as its velocity ˙ e. Suppose the equilibrium (p,e) is regular in that equilibrium prices are locally a smooth
function of the economy. Then welfare is v(b(ξ)) with b(ξ)=( p(ξ),e(ξ)0p(ξ)). Thus a reallocation impacts
welfare only via the budget variables it implies. By the fundamental theorem of calculus the welfare impact
is the integral of ˙ v = Dbv · ˙ b, which by abuse we call the welfare impact. We prefer to quote it not as ˙ vh,
in individual utils, but in the numeraire, as ˙ v∗h = ˙ vh
λh, where λ
h = Dwhvh is the marginal utility of the
numeraire. Roy’s identity gives Dbvh :
Proposition 1 (Envelope) The welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH of ˙ e at a regular equilibrium is
˙ v∗ = ˙ t − z0 ˙ p
where ˙ t ≡ ˙ e0p is its value, and z ∈ RC×H the countries’ excess demands.5
As we show next, at a regular equilibrium there is a unique price adjustment matrix dp,s m o o t hi na
neighborhood of it, such that ˙ p = dp˙ t. Thus the welfare impact diﬀerential is
dv∗ = I − z0dp (2)
5Throughout, an underscore denotes the omission of the numeraire coordinate C.
7This implies that the welfare impact depends on the inﬁnitesimal reallocation only through its value ˙ t, not
its identity ˙ e.
Remark 1 dv∗ is an operator ˙ t 7→ ˙ v∗ in 1⊥ ⊂ RH.
Indeed, 10˙ t =1 0˙ e0p = ˙ r0p =0 given that aggregate resources are ﬁxed, and 10dv∗˙ t =( 1 0− 00dp)˙ t =0
given that total excess demand is zero in equilibrium.




and suppose a path (p(ξ),e(ξ)) of equilibria. Then
xσ((p,e0p)) = r
is an identity. Diﬀerentiating it,
J ˙ p + Dwxσ˙ t =0
An equilibrium is regular if J is invertible. By the implicit function theorem and Walras’ law, at a regular
equilibrium (p,e) equilibrium prices are locally a smooth function of the economy.
Proposition 2 (Price Adjustment) At a regular equilibrium the Price Adjustment is6
dp = −J−1Dwxσ (dp)
This implies that a reallocation matters for prices only through its value, not its identity.
Substituting into (2),
dv∗ = I + z0J−1Dwxσ (dv∗)
This formula generalizes Dixit (1981) from C =2 and appears in Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994).
Note, the welfare impact ˙ v∗ of a reallocation equals its value ˙ t if there is no trade z =0 or if all marginal
propensities to consume Dwhxh agree. (For then ˙ t ∈ 1⊥ implies Dwxσ˙ t =0 .)
6Since demands depend on own income only, Dwxσ =[ Dw1x1 : ... : DwHxH].
8If demand is neoclassical, then the Slutsky decomposition Dpxh = Shλ
h−Dwhxh· xh0 and the equilibrium
incomes e0p imply that Dpxh((p,e0p)) = Shλ
h − Dwhxh· zh0. Adding,
J = S − Dwxσ · z0 (3)
Here the sum S ≡ ΣShλ
h is symmetric and negative deﬁnite, since each summand Shλ
h is.
4D e ﬁnition of threshold
We reinterpret Samuelson’s condition for general C,H, in terms of the requisite trade level L ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 2 (Trade levels for a protagonist: Necessary and Suﬃcient) Fix b ∈ B(r) and the as-
sociated S(b) ∈ RC−1×C−1 in (3). The norm at b is deﬁned on RC−1 as kak =
√
a · a from the inner





for h if every regular b−equilibrium with h a protagonist in the transfer paradox has kzk ≥ L. L is
b−suﬃcient for h if for every ²>0 there is a regular b−equilibrium with h a protagonist in the
transfer paradox and kzk ≤ L + ².
Whenever Ln is necessary and Ls is suﬃcient, Ln ≤ Ls, s ot h e r ei sa tm o s to n et h r e s h o l d :
Deﬁnition 3 Call Lh ∈ R the b−threshold for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox if
it is both b−suﬃcient and necessary for h.
Deﬁnition 4 Call L ∈ R the b−threshold for the transfer paradox if L =m i n h Lh.
Remark 2 As shown in the introduction, Samuelson’s result with C = H =2 means that a threshold exists
and equals 1
k∇k—for both to be protagonists and for the transfer paradox. To fully generalize this, we need to
explicitly compute the inverse of the welfare impact diﬀerential.
7Recall, an inner product is the root of a symmetric, positive deﬁnite quadratic form, and indeed −S−1 is such according
to the consumer theory of Samuelson.
95 The inverse of the welfare impact diﬀerential dv∗
Remarkably, the inverse of dv∗ exists and admits an explicit description!
Theorem 8 (The inverse of the welfare impact diﬀerential dv∗) Suppose the equilibrium is regular,
so that dv∗ is deﬁned. Then it is invertible, with inverse
dv∗−1 = I − z0S−1Dwxσ (dv∗−1)
Proof. We use the decomposition J = S − Dwxσ · z0. By deﬁnition, the inverse of dv∗,s h o u l di te x i s t ,








= I − z0S−1Dwxσ + z0J−1Dwxσ − z0J−1 (Dwxσz0)S−1Dwxσ
= I − z0S−1Dwxσ + z0J−1Dwxσ − z0J−1 (S − J)S−1Dwxσ







dv∗ = I holds.
Remark 3 dv−1∗ is an operator ˙ t 7→ ˙ v∗ in 1⊥ ⊂ RH.
This follows from remark 1.
5.1 A universal example of the arbitrariness of the welfare impact
Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) in the case of general C,H conclude that given any ˙ t, ˙ v ∈ 1⊥
satisfying ˙ th, ˙ vh 6=0 for some h, there exist marginal propensities to consume Dwhxh and net trades
for which ˙ v = dv∗˙ t. Save for Pareto optimality, the welfare impact of reallocations is arbitrary without
knowledge of marginal propensities to consume and of net trades. Here we sharpen this result: the welfare
10impact is arbitrary without knowledge of net trades, even granting knowledge of the marginal propensities to
consume. Both in their construction and in ours, equilibrium prices and incomes are known, but endowments
may be nonpositive.
Our construction is explicit.
Theorem 9 (Universal example of arbitrariness) Fix b =( p,w) ∈ B(r), p l u st h ed e s i r e dw e l f a r ei m -
pact ˙ v ∈ 1⊥ and the desired value ˙ t ∈ 1⊥ of the reallocation. Then except if ∇(b)= def Dwxσ ˙ v =0 and




2∇(˙ t − ˙ v)0
and numeraire endowments set by the budget identity e0p = w, deﬁnes a regular b−equilibrium where the de
facto welfare impact of ˙ t is ˙ v, nonnumeraire excess demand is z, and the trade level kzk is





Conversely, any regular b−equilibrium where the welfare impact of ˙ t is ˙ v has trade level kzk at least
(*).
Proof. Nonnumeraire markets do clear: z1= −1
λk∇k2∇(0 − 0) = 0.S o d o e s t h e n u m e r a i r e m a r k e t :
the numeraire endowments were deﬁned by Walras’ law. Suppose a regular b−equilibrium. Then ˙ v is the
welfare impact of ˙ t iﬀ dv∗−1˙ v = ˙ t, which by theorem 8 means
¡
I − z0S−1Dwxσ¢
˙ v = ˙ t
−z0S−1∇ = ˙ t − ˙ v
−zk0S−1∇ = ˙ tk − ˙ vk
(4)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies
° °zk° °k∇k ≥ zk · ∇ = −zk0S−1∇ hence
° °zk° ° ≥
˙ tk − ˙ vk
k∇k














11To ﬁnd the α =( αk) achieving equality, substitute z0 ≡ α∇





(˙ t − ˙ v)=
1
k∇k
2(˙ t − ˙ v)




2(˙ t − ˙ v)∇
0





¯ ¯ is polynomial in J(˙ t), which is linear in ˙ t (writing ∆ = Dwxσ˙ t):








¯ ¯ is polynomial in ˙ t, hence zero for all but ﬁnitely many values—unless it is the zero polynomial,
which the choice ˙ t = ˙ v rules out: J(˙ v)=S is negative deﬁnite, invertible, making |J(˙ v)| nonzero.
5.2 A universal example of the transfer paradox
For each price-income equilibrium, we construct a compatible equilibrium with the transfer paradox.
Corollary 1 (Universal example of the transfer paradox) Fix b =( p,w) ∈ B(r) with ∇(b) ≡
Dwhxh − Dwixi 6=0 . Then for all λ > 0 but for ﬁnitely many values, the λ-donation from h to i, ˙ t =
λ(1i − 1h), beneﬁts h and hurts i and ﬁxes all others’ welfare, ˙ v∗ =1 h − 1i, at the regular b−equilibrium





and numeraire endowments set by the budget identity e0p = w
Proof. This follows from theorem 9 since ˙ t − ˙ v∗ = −λ˙ v∗ − ˙ v∗ =( 1+λ)(1i − 1h).




Hk∇k is a b−suﬃcient trade level for the transfer paradox.
12Proof. In example 1 kzk =
kλ˙ t−˙ vk2 √
Hk∇k and λ˙ t − ˙ v =( 1+λ)(1i − 1h), so kzk =
√
2(1+λ) √
Hk∇k .Let λ & 0.
Safra (1983) is a predecessor, concluding nonconstructively that ∞ is b−suﬃcient. Note, with H =2
this says that 1
k∇k is suﬃcient, giving half of Samuelson’s result. In this example everyone’s welfare is ﬁxed
other than the donor and the recipient’s; in contrast, with H>2 there are paradoxical equilibria with even
less trade, where the donor aﬀects everyone’s welfare. This is not the threshold with H>2.
6 The threshold for the transfer paradox
Theorem 9 states that the trade level at any regular equilibrium where ˙ v is the welfare impact of ˙ t is at
least kzk ≥
k˙ t−˙ vk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vk, with equality achieved. This suggests that the threshold trade level for the transfer
paradox is the inﬁmum of
k˙ t−˙ vk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vk ”subject to the transfer paradox.” To formalize this we consider a
problem for each possible protagonist h ::
Th(b)= def inf
˙ t,˙ v
° °˙ t − ˙ v
° °
2 √
H kDwxσ ˙ vk
subject to ˙ th ≤ 0, ˙ vh =1 , ˙ t−h ≥ 0,10˙ t =0=1 0˙ v (Ph)
The constraints 10˙ t =0=1 0 ˙ v reﬂect remark 1 on the welfare impact dv∗. The constraints ˙ th ≤ 0, ˙ vh =
1, ˙ t−h ≥ 0 state that h is a protagonist. There is no loss of generality in setting ˙ vh to unity instead
of some positive scalar, because the objective and the other constraints and the equation ˙ t = dv−1˙ v are
invariant to rescalings of (˙ t, ˙ v). The problem is deﬁned only if Dwxσ ˙ v 6=0 for some 0=1 0˙ v, which is
equivalent to
Assumption 1 Not all marginal propensities to consume mi = Dwixi are equal m1 = ... = mH.
Theorem 10 (Protagonist’s threshold) Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1. Then the threshold trade level
for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is the value Th(b) of problem (Ph).
Corollary 2 (Threshold for paradox) Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1. Then the threshold for the
transfer paradox is minh Th(b).
This is true by deﬁnition 4.
13Proof. The last sentence of theorem 9 states that the trade level at any regular equilibrium where ˙ v is
the welfare impact of ˙ t is at least
k˙ t−˙ vk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vk, which is the objective of problem (Ph), whose constraints
s t a t ei na d d i t i o nt h a t h is a protagonist. Therefore the value of problem (Ph)i sb−necessary for h.
Conversely, we show the value of problem (Ph)i sb−suﬃcient for h. We want a sequence of regular
equilibria where h is a protagonist and trade levels converge to Th(b). Let ˙ tn, ˙ vn be a feasible sequence
making
k˙ tn−˙ vnk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vnk converge to the value of problem (Ph). We verify the hypothesis of theorem 9. Clearly,
for all large enough n, ∇n(b)= def Dwxσ ˙ vn 6=0 , else convergence to the ﬁnite inﬁmum would fail. If the
˙ tn are not all distinct, then by continuity of the objective we can perturb them so that they are and still
convergence obtains. Because they are all distinct, for all large enough n, ˙ tn is none of the ﬁnitely many
˙ t0s appearing in the hypothesis. Thus theorem 9 applies to yield a sequence (b,en) of regular b−equilibria
where ˙ vn is the welfare impact of ˙ tn and the trade level is exactly
k˙ tn−˙ vnk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vnk.
We make Th(b) more explicit by considering the auxiliary ˙ v-problem
n(˙ v)= def inf
˙ t
° °˙ t − ˙ v
° °
2 subject to ˙ th ≤ 0, ˙ t−h ≥ 0,10˙ t =0 (n)
The value of this problem is uniquely achieved. Uniqueness owes to the strict convexity of the objective and
the convexity of the feasible set. Existence of a minimizer owes to the continuity of the objective and to
the fact, which we show next, that the closed feasible set can be intersected with a compact ball without
aﬀecting the problem’s value. Indeed, ˙ t =0 is feasible and makes
° °˙ t − ˙ v
° °
2 = k˙ vk2 , so the inﬁmum is
necessarily the limit of some sequence of ˙ t0s inside the compact ball
° °˙ t − ˙ v
° °
2 ≤ k˙ vk2 . Let ˙ t(˙ v) be the
unique minimizer.
Thus if ˙ tn, ˙ vn is a feasible sequence making
k˙ tn−˙ vnk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vnk converging to Th(b), so does
k˙ t(˙ vn)−˙ vnk2 √
HkDwxσ ˙ vnk =
n(˙ v) √
HkDwxσ ˙ vnk because for each n the latter is no larger than the former but still at least Th(b). We conclude
Th(b)=i n f˙ v
n(˙ v) √
HkDwxσ ˙ vk subject to ˙ vh =1 ,0=1 0˙ v (Ph)
We now report n(˙ v).
Lemma 1 (Best donation given welfare impact) Fix ˙ vh =1 ,0=1 0˙ v. Problem n’s value is
n(˙ v)=
¡
ΣS ˙ vi +1
¢2
|S| +1
+ Σ\S ˙ vi2 (6)
14where, on ordering ˙ v−h : ˙ vi1 ≥ ... ≥ ˙ viH−1,S= {i1,...,ik} for the largest n such that
if i ∈ S ˙ vi >
ΣS ˙ vi +1
|S| +1
That is, S ⊂ H − h is the best oﬀ:t h o s eb e t t e ro ﬀ than the average of those even better oﬀ joined by h.
Proof. See appendix.
For example, if ˙ vi6=h = − 1

















h =def mh − 1
H−1Σi6=hmi being the diﬀerence from the mean of all others’ marginal propensities to
consume.
Proof. We know ˙ vi6=h = − 1
H−1 gives n(˙ v)2 = H















Corollary 4 (Appearance of protagonist) Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1. Then h is a protagonist
in the transfer paradox at some equilibrium with any trade level above 1 √
H−1k∇hk.
Corollary 5 (Threshold with multiple goods ) Suppose H =2 . Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1.
Then the threshold trade level Th(b) for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox is exactly 1
k∇hk.
Proof. When H =2 , the constraint set ˙ vh =1 ,0=1 0˙ v in (??) is a singleton, namely ˙ vi6=h = − 1
H−1,
so the upper bound is the inﬁmum.
Samuelson (1947) is the special case H =2=C of this.
Remark 5 It is hard to make the inﬁmum more explicit, since the objective is the ratio of two nonconcave
functions and the constraint set not compact with H>2.
157A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Envelope proposition




In equilibrium wh = eh0p so
dwh = eh0dp + p0deh




h = −xhdp + eh0dp + dth = dth − zh0dp
7.2 Minimizing kt − vk
2
2
Fix ˙ vh = s,0=1 0˙ v.
min
° °˙ t − ˙ v
° °2
2 subject to ˙ th ≤ 0, ˙ t−h ≥ 0,10˙ t =0 (7)
Using the constraints,




˙ th − ˙ vh¢2
+




−10˙ t−h − s
¢2
+
° °˙ t−h − ˙ v−h° °2
2
Write x for ˙ t−h,y for ˙ v−h, so that
kx − yk
2
2 =( 1 0x + s)
2 +( x − y)
0 (x − y)
with constraint −x ≤ 0.
By Kuhn-Tucker (with constraint qualiﬁcation holding by linearity of the constraint), x ≥ 0 solves
the problem iﬀ there is a nonnegative multiplier µ ≥ 0 satisfying complementary slackness such that x
minimizes L,
L =( 1 0x + s)
2 +( x − y)
0 (x − y) − 2µ0x
16This being a convex function, its minimum in RH−1 is achieved at DL =0:
DL =2( 1 0x + s)1 0 +2 ( x − y)0 − 2µ0 =0
That is,
x = y + µ − 1(1 0x + s)
Let S = {i 6= h : xi > 0}. By complementary slackness, this says
if i ∈ Sµ i =0 and xi = yi − (10x + s) > 0
if i/ ∈ Sx i =0 and µi = −yi +( 1 0x + s) ≥ 0
(8)
The above implies
if i ∈ Sy i > 10x + s
if i/ ∈ S 10x + s ≥ yi
We compute 10x + s now:
10x + s = ΣSxi + Σ\Sxi + s
= ΣS
£






− |S|(10x + s)+s
So





Note, since s = ˙ vh, the right side is the average welfare in S+h, so we denote it yS+h. Therefore S = S(y)
satisﬁes
if i ∈ Sy i > yS+h (10)
if i/ ∈ S yS+h ≥ yi (11)
Lemma 2 (identiﬁcation of S) Order ˙ v−h : ˙ vi1 ≥ ... ≥ ˙ viH−1. The above S = {i1,...,in} ⊂ {1,...,H}\{h}
for the largest n such that (10). Further, this description is independent of how ties in v−h are ordered.
17Proof. Since S ⊂ {1,...,H}\{h} must satisfy both (10), (11) it is clear that it consists of the indices
corresponding to the |S| largest elements in v−h. To see it is the largest, it suﬃces to show S+ = S +in+1
violates (10):
yin+1 ≤in+1/ ∈S yS+h ⇒ yin+1 ≤ yS+in+1+h
To see this description is independent of how ties in v−h are ordered, it suﬃces to show S is closed
under ties. That is, if ˙ vin = ˙ vin+1 and in ∈ S, we want in+1 ∈ S. This is immediate, because in+1
satisﬁes (10) since in ∈ S and ˙ vin = ˙ vin+1, and S as described is largest with respect to (10).
We make a few observations about yS+h. It is monotonically decreasing in S. Also, yS >s if S 6= ∅,
and S = ∅ iﬀ x =0 .
Having found S = S(y), the candidate minimizer is described uniquely by substituting (??)i n( 8 ) :
if i ∈ Sx i = yi − yS+h > 0
if i/ ∈ Sx i =0
Then the value n(˙ v)
2 of the problem is given by S :
kx − yk
2

























Remark 6 Property (10) is preserved by reduction. That is, whenever T = {i1,...,i k+1} satisﬁes (10), so
does T − ik+1 = {i1,...,ik}.
Too see why, it suﬃces that yik > yT−ik+1+h, which follows from rewriting yik+1 > yT+h as yik+1 >
yT−ik+1+h and recalling yik ≥ yik+1.
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